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Abstract This paper looks at price and quality competition in software markets under
two different forms of competition—one where two proprietary firms first choose
quality and then engage in price competition, and second where a proprietary firm
faces competition from an open source software (OSS) firm that allows its users to
determine quality level and provides the software at zero price. We find that OSS
competition never improves quality for consumers who value quality highly. However,
it may provide greater quality to users with a low valuation for quality. In addition, we
find that although OSS has a zero market price, the public good nature of OSS
competition can lessen price competition, making the proprietary firm better-off with
increased profit but leaving consumers worse-off with lower surplus.
Keywords Open source software . Duopoly . Price competition . Vertical
differentiation
JEL L17 . D4 . L11

Introduction
The emergence of open source software (OSS) has widely been regarded as changing
the competitive landscape of software markets and challenging the proprietary model of
production. The OSS model of software development is characterized by voluntary
contributions to software development where developers do not own the copyright for
their contributions and as a result cannot appropriate the value of their contributions as
a proprietary developer does. While there has been varied academic opinion about
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which model is more profitable and which generates the best outcome in terms of
quality and innovation, the reality is that software markets are today comprised of both
types of firms, in some cases competing in a duopoly fashion (as with Apple’s iPhone
operating system (OS) and Google’s open source Android OS) and in others dominated
by one form or another. One question that arises in this context is how the nature of
competition differs in each case; how does competition between OSS and proprietary
software (PS) differ from competition between two proprietary firms; and how does this
difference in competition then matter for quality provision, prices and consumer
welfare? Broadly speaking, there are two important features that distinguish OSS from
PS. First, in most cases, OSS is available for free or at a much lower price than PS.
Second, the quality of OSS is determined by the joint effort of many different userdevelopers. So there may be an effort cost from users for quality provision. This public
good aspect to OSS makes it vulnerable to free-riding which can potentially be
exploited by the proprietary seller in her pricing decisions and quality choice. In this
paper, we examine this issue. We consider a model of price and quality competition
between two firms that have different costs of providing quality and where consumers
differ in their value for quality. We assign one firm to be a proprietary firm and then
consider two organizational forms for the second firm—one where it is also proprietary
and the other where it is organized as an OSS.
We find that price competition with an OSS firm may be stronger or weaker
than with another proprietary firm. The price of a PS depends on the value of the
competing product to consumers. With proprietary competition, this is the actual
quality provided by the other PS. However, in the case of OSS competition, this is
the potential quality that would result if current users switched to the OSS and
then contributed towards its quality. If the proprietary firm’s consumers value
quality greatly, they could potentially make large contributions to the OSS; then
price competition to retain these consumers would be very intense. On the other
hand, OSS under-provides quality due to free-riding by its users. Thus PS prices
may be higher or lower under OSS competition depending on market size and
how consumers value quality. Further, with OSS competition, the market may be
served entirely by a single firm though not necessarily by the lower cost firm. In
contrast, proprietary competition always leads to a vertically segmented market
with the high (low) cost firm selling a low (high) quality product. In terms of
quality provision, we find that proprietary competition always provides greater
quality to high value users, but not necessarily so for low value consumers. Even
with lower quality, consumer surplus may be higher with OSS competition if price
competition is more intense.

Literature Review
There is a growing economic literature on the development of OSS and its relationship
with traditional proprietary firms. Many economists have examined the incentives
governing OSS provision. Lakhani and von Hippel (2003) note that innovations in
OSS arise from developers’ need to solve programming problems for their own use.
Lerner and Tirole (2002) highlight two benefits that OSS provides to developers—
direct user benefits as they improve the quality of a software program for their own use

Open Source Software: Competition with A Public Good

335

and reputational benefits from solving programming problems. Atal and Shankar
(2014) argue that reputational concerns dominate effort provision in early stages of
OSS development when the software is being designed, while user benefits are
important for making the software commercially usable to end-users. Since we are
studying competition from OSS that makes it to the market for end-use, we focus on the
user benefits from OSS development and the public good under-provision problem that
arises as a result.
The public good nature of OSS development was first highlighted by Johnson
(2002) who explores the implications of the public good nature of OSS provision for
software innovation. Using the standard public good provision model he shows why an
open source license may not produce innovation in certain valuable projects. We adopt
a public good provision model for OSS development similar to the one outlined by
Johnson (2002). But, unlike his analysis, we focus on what that means for competition
between OSS and PS.
A few recent papers have examined the nature of competition between PS and OSS
as we do here. Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2006) look at competition between
the two forms of software in the presence of demand-side network externalities. They
show that, while competition from OSS may cause the proprietary firm to lower its
price, users may be worse-off from this competition as developers make fewer applications compatible with the PS. Mustonen (2003) looks at competition between OSS
and PS when the two simultaneously compete for developers in the labor market and
consumers in the software market. The decision by developers to join the proprietary
employer or an OSS project in turn determines the quality of the software under the two
forms and hence influences competition in the market for software. Most recently,
Athey and Ellison (2014) use a model of reciprocal altruism among OSS developers to examine competition between commercial software and OSS. They show
that when developers care about the altruism displayed by other developers through
their contributions, a “critical mass” hurdle needs to be passed for OSS development to occur. Further, given this critical mass effect, commercial competitors have
an incentive to price their products very low during the early stages of software
development in order to prevent the critical mass from being reached in the OSS
development process.
All three papers described above focus on the competitive interaction between OSS
and a proprietary firm relative to the case where the market is dominated by a single
proprietary firm. In contrast, our paper looks at how the nature of competition changes
when the proprietary firm faces an OSS competitor compared to when it faces another
proprietary competitor. In addition, we examine how the quality provision of the
software and prices differ.

A Brief Historical Overview
The software market provides an interesting yet complicated subject for economic
analysis because of its highly dynamic nature. In this section, we provide a brief
historical background by looking at three markets within computer software—(1)
the desktop OS market where competition has primarily revolved around two
proprietary firms—Apple and Microsoft; (2) the web server OS market where
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OSS (in particular, Apache) has been the dominant player, and (3) the mobile OS,
currently a duopoly between Apple’s proprietary iOS and Google’s open source
Android platform.
At the beginning of the PC era, Apple and Microsoft were the two dominant
companies. Until the 1990s, Apple commanded more than 10 % market share and
dominated much of graphical desktop computing. However, Apple started to lose
market share as desktop manufacturers, most notably, IBM adopted Microsoft’s
MSDOS in the 1990s. Instead of aggressively competing, Apple chose to keep prices
high to attract consumers who valued quality. However Apple’s dominance from the
market began to wane through the 1990s and Microsoft Windows became a virtual
monopoly with over 90 % market share by the end of that decade. The Apple-Microsoft
duopoly surfaced again in the 2000s. Microsoft released Windows XP, which became
the company’s primary OS while Apple debuted its Mac OS X 10.0. Microsoft released
a series of updates to XP, but few were major. By contrast, Apple released several new
versions of Mac OS X with significant feature updates and performance enhancements
that made its OS run faster. Apple also developed exclusive retail stores that enabled it
to vertically differentiate its more expensive products from cheaper Windows machines
more effectively.
While Apple’s OS X has been making steady gains, OSS such as Linux has not seen
the same success, making up less than 1 % of the market. On the other hand, OSS has
had a major influence on web technology and the web server market. The leading
server, Apache’s HTTP, controls more than 50 % of the market and is far ahead of
Microsoft which has a slim 20 % share. As cloud computing and internet usage
becomes an integral part of the future, the role of OSS in the coming years cannot be
discounted.
Recent years have seen the rise of mobile computing. At present, this market is a
duopoly, with Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android OS making up more than 90 % of the
market. As of August 2013, the market shares for Android and Apple were 51.6 and
40.7 % respectively. The Android OS is released under the Apache license, an open
source license. There is no conclusive evidence on whether open source Android
produces a higher quality experience. Yet the general consensus is that the market is
vertically segmented with Apple producing a better quality product. While the
open nature of the Android OS has enabled it to support more apps relative to
iOS, there is a worry that individual decisions from app developers do not
consider the greater good of a unified Android platform. This highlights the
public good problem faced by OSS.
It is tempting to draw similarities between the Microsoft-Apple competition in the
desktop OS market with today’s Apple-Google competition in the mobile market.
However, as we argue in this paper, the public good nature of the Android substantively
changes the playing field and has very different implications for consumer welfare and
prices and quality set by the proprietary firm (or Apple). Competition between two
proprietary firms is essentially dominated by competition for software consumers. An
open source firm by contrast allows users to voluntarily contribute and add value to the
software. It thus integrates the roles of consumers as both users and developers. Thus
by competing for users, the proprietary firm simultaneously competes for developers
who influence OSS quality. At the same time, the public good under-provision problem
in OSS gives an inherent advantage to the proprietary firm. Attracting the best user-
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developers, enhances its market share and also lowers the quality of the competing
open source product.

The Model and Analysis
There are two consumer groups with value for quality, vi ∈{v H,v L}, v H >v L. Let us call
the high and low value consumers group H and group L respectively. Consumer i’s
1
utility is [vi f (Q)−p], where f ðQÞ ¼ Q2 , Q is quality and p is price. There are N>1
consumers of each type. On the production side, there is a proprietary seller, firm 1,
who chooses quality Q1 in the first stage and then a single price p1. There are no
production costs, but the cost of quality is c1Q1, c1 >0. Firm 1 may face competition
from another seller, firm 2, who provides software of quality Q2 at a cost of c2Q2, c1 ≠
c2. We consider two organizational forms for firm 2; one where it is also proprietary
like firm 1 and second where it is organized as an OSS with users making voluntary
contributions towards software quality. In the context of an OSS, consumers serve both
user and developer roles.
A few points about the difference between the proprietary and open source models
of production are worth elucidating. First, a proprietary firm charges consumers a
positive price. On the other hand, OSS is available freely to all users. However, users
who contribute towards its quality incur a marginal cost of c2. Second, OSS users
determine their optimal contribution level by maximizing their own utility and the
quality of the OSS is the aggregate contribution from all users. So every consumer who
joins and uses OSS contributes so that her marginal benefit from contribution, vi f ′ (Q)
equals her marginal cost c2. As a result, individual users ignore the positive externality
of their contribution on other users in the network leading to under-provision of
contributions. By contrast, a proprietary firm appropriates revenue from all its users.
Hence the firm chooses the quality level where marginal cost equals total additional
benefit over all its users.
To ensure that the market is vertically segmented when two proprietary firms
compete, we assume that there is sufficient variation in the value for quality by the
two consumer groups, i.e., v H >3v L. The equilibrium concept used is Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium. We restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria where consumers of
the same type make the same choices.1
Below we describe two market situations for software production; the first where
both firms are proprietary, and the second where firm 1 is proprietary but firm 2 is
organized as an OSS.
Duopoly Competition between Proprietary Firms
Let us start by looking at the case where there are two proprietary firms in the market.
Firms first choose quality simultaneously and then compete on price. We solve the
1

To ensure the existence of a price equilibrium for every quality choice, we make the following tie-breaking
assumptions. If a consumer is indifferent between buying the good and not buying at all, she buys the good. If
she is indifferent between the two firms, she chooses the higher quality firm. And if the firm is indifferent
between selling to only one group and selling to both groups, it sells to both groups.
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equilibrium in prices and quality by backward induction. In the second stage, firms
choose prices given quality choice Qi and Qj by firms i and j respectively in stage 1.
Except for the difference in quality, the two firms are otherwise identical in this stage
since there are no production costs. The lemma below summarizes the price equilibrium in the second stage, given Qi and Qj. Without loss of generality, let us assume that
Qi ≥Qj. The outlines for all proofs are provided in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 If Qi =Qj, then p∗i =p∗j =0. If the difference in qualities is small enough, then
in every price equilibrium firm i covers the entire market at a price pi ¼
h  1 1
i
v L Q2i −Q2j þ pj . If the difference in qualities is large enough, then pi ¼
h
i
1
1
1
v H Q2i −ðv H −v L ÞQ2j and pj ¼ v L Q2j . Group H buys from firm i and group L buys
from firm j.
If Qi =Qj, then Bertrand price competition drives prices and profits to zero. If the
difference in quality between the two firms is small but positive, then the higher quality
firm i sells to both consumer groups driving the other firm out of the market. Firm i
then simply charges a price equal to group L’s reservation value that makes them
indifferent between firms i and j. Firm j can choose a range of prices in this equilibrium,
but it does not get any demand. This is because when the difference in quality between
the two firms is small, the price at which i can get group H’s demand is not much
greater than the price at which it can get L’s demand. However, as we show below in
Proposition 1, firms in the first stage never choose quality in this range. Finally, if Qi is
much higher than Qj, then the unique equilibrium is a vertically differentiated market
where H buy from i and L buy from j. Firm i cannot extract the entire valuation from H.
In order to ensure their demand, i has to make them indifferent between buying Qj at
price pj and buying Qi. But Firm j, can charge the highest possible price from L since it
does not face a binding incentive constraint.
Now let us look at quality competition in the first stage. Without loss of generality,
let ci <cj. The two firms choose different quality levels in order to limit price competition in the second stage. However, the low cost firm does not necessarily produce the
higher quality product. If the difference in cost between the two firms is low enough,
then an equilibrium exists where j produces the higher quality product. But if the
difference in the cost of quality provision is sufficiently high, then a unique equilibrium
emerges where Qi >Qj. Proposition 1 states this.
Proposition 1 In a duopoly where both firms are proprietary with ci <cj, the equilib H 2  L 2
rium is as follows: Qi ¼ N2cv i
> Nv
¼ Qj , where firm i sells to group H and
2c j
firm j sells to group L. In addition, if the difference in marginal cost is small enough,
 L 2  H 2
then there is another equilibrium where Qi ¼ N2cvi
< N2cv j
¼ Qj , and i sells to
group L while j sells to group H.
In cases where there are multiple equilibria, we restrict the equilibrium to the one
where the lower cost firm provides the higher quality. Note that, for both firms, quality
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increases with N. This is because the proprietary firm’s revenue from quality increases
as the number of consumers increase, while the cost of providing that quality does not.
Duopoly with an Open Source Competitor
Now, suppose firm 2 operates as an open source firm where consumers determine
quality jointly through contributions. Let qH and qL represent the contribution
from an H and L consumer respectively. Then the expected payoff to consumer
h 
i
1
H
L 2
H
k in group H from contributing q H
ðN −1ÞqH þ qH
þ
N
q
−c
q
2
k is v
k
k : Let
 H 2
v
: QH
us define, QoH ¼ 2c
o represents the ideal quality level for a contributing
2
H user in the OSS. If aggregate contributions from other users exceeds this
ideal quality level, then qH
k = 0 and k free-rides on others’ contributions. If,
however, total contribution from all other users is lower than QH
o , then k simply
contributes the residual amount to achieve her ideal quality, i.e.,



0;
if ðN −1ÞqH þ N q L > QH
H
o;


qk ¼
QoH − ðN −1ÞqH þ N qL ;
otherwise:
 L 2
v
is the ideal quality for group L users; QLo <QH
Similarly, QoL ¼ 2c
o . Then,
2



0;
if ðN −1ÞqL þ N qH > QLo ;
L


ql ¼
QoL − ðN −1Þq L þ N q H ;
otherwise:
We assume that all users of the same type contribute equal amounts in equilibrium.
Then it is straightforward to see that in any equilibrium, where users from group H join
H
L
the OSS, the quality is Q H
o . If L users join, they free-ride since Q o > Qo . Given that L
H
users never contribute, H users find it optimal to contribute Qo in aggregate. In a
symmetric equilibrium, this means qH
k ¼

QoH
N

: If, in equilibrium, H users do not join
QL

o
the OSS while L users do, then each L user contributes qL
l ¼ N ; to achieve their ideal
L
quality Q o.
In every case, the quality of the software does not depend on N since each user only
cares about her own value and not the value that her contribution generates to the other
users in the network. This is the classic public good under-provision problem. Furthermore, note that the quality of OSS is determined during the price competition phase
itself. Since the price chosen by firm 1 determines who joins the OSS, it affects
contributions made to OSS and hence its quality. In Lemma 2, we describe the
equilibrium price given Q1 when the proprietary seller competes with an OSS firm.

e 1 , pl1 and ph1 (defined in the proof in the appendix) such
Lemma 2 There exist Qh1, Q
e 1;
that if Q1 <Qh1, then no one buys from the proprietary seller (firm 1); if Qh1 ≤ Q1 ≤ Q
h l
e 1 ; then
then firm 1 sells to both consumer groups at a price p1 =min{p1,p1}; if Q1 > Q
firm 1 sells to group H only at a price p1 =ph1.
Similar to what we found in Lemma 1 with proprietary competition, it continues to
be the case that when firm 1’s quality is high enough, a vertically differentiated market
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emerges; while it is also possible for the market to be served by a single firm that
provides the software to both consumer groups. However, it is worth noting the
following difference in the price equilibrium that emerges with OSS competition. With
proprietary competition, group L’s reservation price to buy firm 1’s good is always
lower than group H’s reservation price. However, with OSS competition, group L’s
reservation price, pl1, could be higher or lower than group H’s reservation price, ph1. This
is because the quality of the competing OSS depends on whether it is comprised of
group H or group L. Although group L values quality less than group H, they may still
get higher utility from the OSS since their contribution levels and costs in the OSS firm
b1
are lower. It is easy to see that when firm 1’s quality is high enough, ph1 > pl1. Define Q
as the quality where pl1 = ph1.
This also means that whereas with two proprietary firms, quality competition leads
to a differentiated market where both firms have a positive market share, with OSS
competition this need not happen. In particular, depending on costs, the market may be
served by a single OSS firm, a single proprietary firm or by both firms vertically
segmenting the market. The proposition below describes this equilibrium. We restrict
the number of cases to consider by assuming that when firm 1 covers the market, it
b1 .
chooses the lowest quality that gets both groups’ demand, i.e. Q
Proposition 2 When firm 1 faces competition from an OSS competitor, there exist cH
1
L
and cL1 (defined in the proof in the appendix) with cH
1 ≥c1 >c2 such that firm 1 does
not produce and all consumers join the OSS firm if c1 >cH
1 , firm 1 sells only to group H
 H 2
L
Nv
if c1 ≤c1 with quality Q1 ¼ 2c1
and firm 1 covers the market if cL1 <c1 ≤cH
1 with quality
 H 2
pﬃﬃﬃ
b1 < Nv
; the intermediate range is empty if vH > 3 þ 2 2 v L :
Q
2c1
As explained above, it is possible for firm 1 to stay out of the market if her costs are
high relative to OSS costs. For intermediate costs, she may cover the market if the
difference in valuation between the two consumer groups is not too high. Finally, if
firm 1’s cost is low enough, she provides the monopoly quality level to group H, and
group L consumers join the OSS firm. Note that when firm 1 competes with an OSS, it
L
never serves just group L. If group H joins the OSS firm, OSS quality is QH
o > Qo . Then
L consumers free-ride on this high quality OSS and firm 1 does not find it profitable to
match group L’s OSS payoff. If this happens, firm 1 prefers to stay out of the market.

Proprietary Competitor Versus Open Source Competitor
In this section, we compare the market outcomes under both forms of competition.
Comparing profits, it is straightforward to see that when firm 1 is the higher cost firm,
i.e., c1 >c2, it always has a positive market share when firm 2 is proprietary. However, if
firm 2 is an OSS firm, then for c1> cH
1 , firm 1 does not produce. So if firm 1’s costs are
very high relative to its competitor, its profits are always higher with proprietary
competition. When c1 <c2, the difference in firm 1’s profits between the two competitive forms depends on the size of the market and the difference in valuation of the two
consumer groups. This is stated below.
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Proposition 3 If c1 <c2, then firm 1 makes higher profit with a proprietary competitor
than with an OSS competitor if and only if either N≤4 or vH >βvL where β is defined in
the proof in appendix. If c1 >c2, then there exists bc1 > c2 such that firm 1 makes higher
profit with a proprietary competitor than with an OSS competitor if and only if c1 > bc1 .
The above proposition highlights the role of price competition and free-riding in an
OSS market. In order to understand the dynamics of competing with an OSS firm,
 H 2
consider the case where c1 <c2. Here firm 1 provides quality Q1 ¼ N4cv1
to group H
consumers irrespective of whether it competes with another proprietary firm or an OSS
firm. In this case, the difference in profits arises from the outside option for group H
users. Under proprietary duopoly competition, the price that firm 1 can extract depends
on the quality provided by the other firm, i.e., Q2. When firm 2 is an OSS, firm 1 has to
compete against the potential quality that would result if H users joined the OSS, i.e.,
H
QH
o . Comparing Q2 and Q o , we see that there are two factors that affect the difference
in the two quality levels. First, Q H
o depends on the valuation of group H users,
while Q2 depends on v L. This tends to make Q H
o relatively high. Second,
however, because of potential free-riding by group H, the quality provision in
the OSS is not affected by the number of users. By contrast, for a proprietary
firm, the marginal revenue from quality increases with N. Thus Q2 increases
with N, making it harder for firm 1 to charge a higher price in the presence of
a proprietary competitor.
Comparing quality, we find that group H users get an equal or higher quality product
when firm 1 competes with a proprietary seller. If firm 1 is the lower cost seller, then they
enjoy the same quality under both markets. If c2 <c1 ≤cH
1 , then they are served by the lower
cost firm in the proprietary duopoly market and hence quality is higher. If c1 >cH
1 , then freeriding by group H users in the OSS firm drives down the quality of the software below
that provided by the proprietary firm in a proprietary duopoly. For group L, on
the other hand, quality may be higher or lower under OSS. The quality enjoyed
by L users is higher under proprietary duopoly only when c1 ≤cL1 , i.e., when H
is served by the proprietary seller and L users contribute to the OSS firm.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium quality of the product for group H consumers is
(weakly) better when duopoly competition is among two proprietary firms than with
an OSS firm. Existence of an OSS competitor can improve quality to group L consumers if c1 >cL1.
Consumer surplus for group L is always higher with OSS competition since they
receive zero surplus in a proprietary duopoly. However, group H may see a lower
surplus if potential free-riding mitigates price competition with OSS. As a result,
overall consumer surplus may be higher or lower depending on the market size and
the relative valuation of group H and group L.
Proposition 5 There exists ec1 < cH
such that consumer surplus under duopoly
1
competition between two proprietary firms is higher than that under duopoly with an
OSS firm if and only if maxfc1 ; c2 g < ec1 . As the number of consumers N increases or
H
the relative valuation vv L decreases, ec1 increases.
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The price charged by the proprietary firm under OSS competition depends on how
high the potential quality under OSS competition is if group H joined the OSS firm.
This is increasing in v H. As a result, when v H is high, group H consumers are better off
under OSS competition as price competition is more intense. Similarly, a low N implies
that the loss in quality from free-riding in an OSS market is smaller.

Conclusion
The nature of competition in software markets has evolved over the decades as OSS
firms are playing an increasingly important role in influencing the competitive landscape. By integrating the role of users and developers, OSS provides leverage to users
in the price that proprietary firms can charge. But at the same time, it is well recognized
that public good aspects of OSS make quality provision difficult. This paper looked at
the incentives of a seller of PS to provide quality when facing competition from OSS
that has public good characteristics. Quality provision in OSS occurs through contributions by developers. Since OSS is available to all consumers, it functions as a public
good and hence is prone to under-provision of quality by developers. The paper looked
at how the public good nature of the competing product’s quality can affect the
incentives for investing in quality by the PS firm. We compared the price and quality
outcomes to the case where two proprietary firms competed in a traditional duopoly
market. We found several interesting results. First, while a proprietary duopoly always
results in vertical differentiation, OSS competition may lead to a single firm serving all
consumers. Second, profits to the proprietary firm can be higher or lower with an OSS
competitor as compared to another proprietary competitor depending on the intensity of
price competition under the two market situations, which in turn depends on the
severity of the free-riding problem faced by OSS. Conversely, consumers were
better-off with OSS competition when it increased the intensity of price competition.
Acknowledgments We are grateful to the participants of 2014 International Industrial Organization Conference and an anonymous referee for valuable comments.

Appendix: Outlines of the Proofs2
Proof of Lemma 1 If Qi =Qj, then Bertrand competition drives prices and profits to zero
for both firms. Without loss of generality, let Qi >Qj. We can show that in any
 1 1
1
equilibrium pj ≤ v L Q2j : Then demand for firm i is zero if pi > v H Q2i −Q2j þ p j , N
 1 1
 1 1
if v H Q2i −Q2j þ p j ≥ pi > v L Q2i −Q2j þ p j and 2N otherwise.
 1 1
Firm i covers the market if and only if p j ≥ ðv H −2v L Þ Q2i −Q2j which is possible only
 H L 2
 H L 2
−v
−v
Q j : (a) When Q j < Qi ≤ vvH −2v
Q j , i covers the market
if Qi ≤ vvH −2v
L
L
2

More detailed proofs are available from the authors on request.
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 1 1
with pi ¼ v L Q2i −Q2j þ pj . Since j can never get any demand every pj* such
 1 1
1
that ðv H −2v L Þ Q2i −Q2j ≤ p j  ≤ v L Q2j can be justified as an equilibrium.
To ensure continuity in i’s profit function in stage 1, we assume
h
 1 1
i
h
i
1
1
1
that pj ¼ 12 ðvH −2v L Þ Q2i −Q2j þ v L Q2j ; so that pi ¼ 12 v H Q2i −ðvH −vL ÞQ2j : (b)
 H L 2
−v
Q j , i never finds it profitable to cover the market. So j serves L with
When Qi > vvH −2v
L
h
i
1
1
1
pj ¼ vL Q2j ; and i sells to L at pi ¼ v H Q2i −ðv H −v L ÞQ2j :
Proof of Proposition 1 First, note from Lemma 1 that Q∗i >0 and Q∗j >0. Also Q j  ∉
 H L 2
 H L 2
 H L 2




v −2v
v −2v
v −2v
Q
;
Q
∉
Q
;
Q
<
Qj ; then i sells
and
Q
:
If
Q
H
L
H
L
i
i
i
i
j
j
v −v
v −v
v H −v L


1
to L and earns a profit of N v L Q2i −ci Qi : If Qi >Q∗j , then i covers the market and earns


 12
1
a profit of N v H Q2i −ðv H −v L Þ Qj
−ci Qi : Given these profits, the best response
 H 2
 H L 2
 L 2
Þ
if 0 < Qj ≤ N ðv 4cþv
and Nv
otherwise. Similarly, we get
of i, Q∗i , is N2cv i
2ci
i
the best response of j. Without loss of generality, let ci ≤cj. Then the possible
 H 2
 L 2
 L 2
equilibria are: ðiÞQi ¼ N2cv i
and Qj ¼ N2cv j ; and ðiiÞQi ¼ N2cvi
and
 H 2
L
only if ðv H2vþv L Þc j ≤ ci :
Qj ¼ N2cv j
For vH >3vL, if Q∗i >Q∗j , Qi >



v H −v L
v H −2v L

2

Qj , and we get vertical differentiation.

Proof of Lemma 2 Given the price of the proprietary good p1, let us derive the OSS
network equilibrium. We consider only symmetric equilibrium, where all consumers from
the same group contribute the same amount. In a symmetric equilibrium, L’s best response,
q L∗, given that H users in aggregate contribute NqH, is N1 QoL −qH if NqH ≤QLo and zero
L
otherwise. H always contribute qH ¼ N1 QH
o −q : If H users join the network, then
H
L
quality of the OSS is at least Qo >Qo and L do not contribute anything. If L users join but
H do not, then they contribute QLo. So comparing utilities to win H’s demand, the
h 1
i
1
proprietary firm has to set Q1 ≥Qh1 and p1 ≤ph1, where ph1 ¼ vH Q21 − QoH 2 þ cN2 QH
o
1
and Q1h ¼ QH
o 1− 2N

2

< QoH : To win L’s demand when H does not join the OSS, the
h 1
i
1
firm has to set Q1 ≥Ql1 and p1 ≤pl1, where pl1 ¼ vL Q21 − QLo 2 þ cN2 QoL and Ql1 ¼ QoL

1 2
b 1 , where Q
b1 ¼
1− 2N
< Qh1 : Note that p l1 < p h1 if and only if Q1 ≥ Q
h
i2
1
1
H
L
> Qh1 : If H joins the OSS, then to win L’s demand, firm 1 has
2c2 1− 2N ðv þ v Þ
h 1
i
1


l
l
H 2
L
2
b
and
p
≤b
p
where
p
¼
v
Q
−
Q
< min pl1 ; ph1 : Using the price
to set Q1 ≥QH
o
1
o
1
1
1

and quality cut-offs derived here, we can summarize the equilbrium as follows. If Q1 <Qh1,
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e1 > Q
b 1 as Q
e 1 ¼ 1 1− 1
then no one buys from the proprietary seller. Define Q
2c2
2N
ððv H Þ2 −2ðv L Þ2 Þ

e 1 ; firm 1 charges p1 =min{pl1,ph1} and covers the
: Then for Qh1 ≤ Q1 ≤ Q
e 1 ; then firm 1 sells only to H at p1 =ph1.
entire market. Finally, if Q1 > Q
ðv H −2v L Þ

b 1 : Further, as long as we assume that
Proof of Proposition 2 It can be shown that Q1 ≥ Q
H
L
v ≥ 3.8v , we can show that if the seller covers the market she will choose
b 1 where pl1 =ph1. Some extensive algebra gives us the following cutquality Q1 ¼ Q
offs for cost that determine the equilibrium quality provision. Define cH
1 ¼ max
n
o 2
2
H L
H
v
N
a n d cL1 ¼ minfα; 1g ð2NN−1Þ c2 ; w h e r e α ¼ ðvH2vþvL Þ2
1; ðv8v
H þvL Þ2
ð2N−1Þ c2 ;
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
 H
ðv þ 2vL Þ− vL ð2vH þ 3v L Þ : Then the proprietary seller does not produce and
H 2

ðv Þ
h
all consumers join the OSS if c1 > cH
1 ; she sells only to H at price p ¼ 2
h
i
 H 2

N
1 1
Nv
−
1−
¼
if c1 ≤ cL1 ; she covers the market at
and
quality
Q
1
c1
2N c2
2c1
pﬃﬃﬃ L
H L
1
H
b 1 if cL1 <c1 ≤cH
price pl ¼ v2cv2 1− 2N
and quality Q
1 . Note that if v > 3 þ 2 2 v
then cL1 >cH
1 and this range is empty.

Proof of Proposition 3 Comparing the maximized proprietary profits under OSS
d
competition, (πOSS
1 ) and proprietary competition (π1) derived in Propositions 1
H 2

N
and 2, we get the following. When c1 <c2 <c L1 , πd1 ¼ ðN4cv 1 Þ − 2c
ðv H −v L ÞvL and
2
H 2

2

2

ðN v Þ
ð2N−1Þ H
H 2
2 H
L L
d
oss
πoss
1 ¼ 4c1 − 4c2 ðv Þ : Then π1 >π1 if and only if (2N−1)(v ) >2N (v −v )v

qﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
which is true if and only if N≤4 or vH >βvL, where β ¼ ð2NN−1Þ N þ ðN −2Þ2 −2 : If
L 2

oss
d
H
oss
c1 >c2, πd1 ¼ ðN4cv 1Þ : If c2 ≤cH
1 <c1, then π1 =0<π1. When c2 <c1 ≤c1 , π1 ¼ max
n H2
o
ðN v Þ
ð2N−1Þ
d
oss
H 2 ð2N−1Þ H L
b
if c1 > bc1 ; where
4c1 − 4c2 ðv Þ ; 2c2 v v −c1 Q1 . Then π1 >π1

(

bc1 ¼ max

2

ð v H Þ −ð v L Þ
ð vH Þ 2

2

;

2v L
ð vH þ vL Þ 2

qﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ)
2v H þ ð2vH Þ2 −ðvH þ vL Þ2

N2
c2 :
ð2N −1Þ

Proof of Proposition 4 Comparing the equilibrium qualities derived under duopoly and
H
L
L
OSS competition, we see that QH
d ≥Qoss, with a strict inequality if c1 >c2. Qd >Qoss if
L
and only if c1 ≤c1, where L users can join the OSS and H users are served by the
proprietor.
Proof of Proposition 5 Let CSd and CSOSS be the consumer surplus under duopoly
2

and OSS competition respectively. Then CS d ¼ 2maxNfc1 ;c2 g ðvH −vL ÞvL and CS oss ¼


2
2
ð2N −1Þ
Þ H 2
oss
ð vH Þ þ ð vL Þ
= ð2N4c−1
ðv Þ þ 2cN2 vH vL otherwise. If
if c1 ≤cH
1 and CS
4c2
2
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oss
oss
d
c1 >cH
>CS d always. If c1 ≤cH
1 , we find that CS
1 , then CS >CS if and only if

maxfc1 ; c2 g >

2ðv H −v L Þv L N 2
c
ðv H Þ2 þðv L Þ2 ð2N −1Þ 2

¼ ec1 :

References
Atal, V., & Shankar, K. (2014). Developers’ incentives and open source software licensing: GPL vs. BSD.
Working paper available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2426211. Accessed 28 April 2014.
Athey, S., & Ellison, G. (2014). Dynamics of open source movements. Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy, 23(2), 294–316.
Casadesus-Masanell, R., & Ghemawat, P. (2006). Dynamic mixed duopoly: a model motivated by Linux vs.
Windows. Management Science, 52(7), 1072–1084.
Johnson, J. P. (2002). Open source software: private provision of a public good. Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy, 11(4), 637–662.
Lakhani, K., & von Hippel, E. (2003). How open source software works: ‘free’ user-user assistance. Research
Policy, 32(6), 923–943.
Lerner, J., & Tirole, J. (2002). Some simple economics of open source. Journal of Industrial Economics,
50(2), 197–234.
Mustonen, M. (2003). Copyleft—the economics of Linux and other open source software. Information
Economics and Policy, 15(1), 99–121.

